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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING 
Co., a corporation, and WYOMING 
MINERAL CORPORATION, a corporation: 
Defendants and Respondents. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
BRIEF OF APPBLLAMT 
Case No. 16209 
This is a suit by a building subcontractor 
against the building owner, the project engineer, and the 
general contractor to recover the subcontractor's greatly 
increased costs that resulted from the general 
contractor's errors and from the engineer's mismanagement 
of the project. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff-subcontractor is appealing from a 
summary judgment of the Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, The Honorable G. Hal Taylor presiding, 
dismissing all but one of its claims. Plaintiff 
voluntarily dismissed its claims against Kennecott Copper 
Corporation, and the claims of Count VII of the 
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complaint. Those claims are not involved in this appeal. 
In addition, the remaining defendants have admitted 
liability under one of plaintiff's counts (Count III) and 
that count is not involved in this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the summary 
judgment entered below in favor of defendants and a remand 
to the district court for trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action by a building subcontractor to 
recover approximately sixty-four thousand dollars incurred 
as a result of the errors, delay and inefficiency of a 
poorly-managed construction project. The job was the 
construction of a large and sophisticated uranium 
extraction plant for Wyoming Mineral Corporation (a 
subsidiary of Westinghouse Electric Corporation) on land 
leased from Kennecott Copper Corporation at the mouth of 
Bingham Canyon, Utah. (R. 2). 
Plaintiff Allen-Howe Specialties Corporation 
(•plaintiff") is a steel erection subcontractor that 
provided the skilled craftsmen necessary to erect the 
steel building that houses the uranium extraction plant. 
Plaintiff was responsbile to the general contractor, U.S. 
Construction, Inc. ("U.S. Contruction") which, in turn, 
was responsible to the project engineer, Jacobs 
Engineering Company ("Jacobs Engineering"). 
- 2 -
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Management and scheduling of the project were 
extremely critical because of the large pieces of 
equipment that had to be incorporated into the building, 
the small and crowded job site, the large nuaber of 
different crafts used on the project, and the liaited ttae 
for construction. (R. 240 at 39-40, 72-73, 84-85; R. 239 
at 5-13, 45-46). The project fell behind schedule froa 
the beginning. Part of the delay was due to changes in 
the project plans and specifications. (R. 238 at 82). 
Part was due to bad weather hindering the pouring of the 
concrete foundation that had to be in place before 
plaintiff could begin work. (R. 239 at 43-447 R. 240 at 
93). Part was due to u.s. Construction's delay in 
painting the structural steel and delivering it to the 
site. (R. 238 at 83: R. 239 at 44). Part was due to u.s. 
Construction's sandblasting away the identifying markings 
on the structural steel. (R.238 at 82-83). The result of 
these delays was that as plaintiff was beginning work, the 
project was already four weeks behind schedule. (R. 239 
at 45). 
In order to keep the start-up delay from delaying 
completion of the project, Jacobs Engineering scheduled 
more simultaneous work by different crafts on the crowded 
construction site. (R. 240 at 72-73, 84). The result, of 
course, was that the various crafts interferred with each 
other, requiring plaintiff to spend substantially more 
- 3 -
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hours and more money -- on the job than foreseen. 
(Id.; R. 237, ex. D-34). 
For example, plaintiff anticipated that the 
building's interior steel sheeting could be installed at 
the rate of 2.25 man-hours per square. Near the end of 
the project, when the sheeting was actually installed, the 
interference from equipment and other workmen was so 
intense that six to seven man-hours were required per 
square. (R. 237, ex. D-34). The interference restricted 
the use of scaffolding, required plaintiff's employees to 
move the scaffolding frequently, and restricuted the 
proper deployment of materials, all of which greatly 
increased labor costs. (Id.) 
In addition to the problem of interference from 
other crafts, errors by u.s. Construction caused massive 
amounts of wasted time and, hence, higher labor costs. 
For example, some of the structural steel members would 
not fit together, some were not identified because u.s. 
Construction sandblasted away or painted over the 
identifying marks applied at the factory, and a number of 
threaded fasteners were painted by mistake and had to be 
cleaned and rethreaded before they could be used. 
at 83, 84, 125). 
(R. 238 
The Complaint raises several theories on which 
plaintiff is entitled to recover its losses from U.S. 
Construction, Jacobs Engineering, and Wyoming Mineral. 
- 4 -
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Those material to this appeal are: 
COUNT I -- MECHANIC'S LIBN PORBCLOSURB (agalnat 
Wyoming Mineral Corporation (•wyoming Mineral•), lea8ee of 
the real property) • Plaintiff is entitled to have ita 
mechanic's lien foreclosed, if necessary, to secure 
payment of its claims. 
COUNT II -- MONEY DUE AND OWING (agaist U.S. 
Construction). Plaintiff is entitled to recover the ~ney 
u.s. Construction owes it for its work on the project. 
COUNT IV -- BREACH OF CONTRACT (against U.S. 
Construction) • Plaintiff is entitled to recover daaages 
for u.s. Contruction's many breaches of contract, 
including failure to deliver the structural steel to the 
job site, failure to deliver proper steel, failure to 
deliver the structual steel in proper sequence, failure to 
paint the structural steel properly, failure to identify 
the structural steel, obliteration of identification 
markings on the structural steel, and interference with 
the orderly prosecution of plaintiff's work on the project. 
COUNT V -- BREACH OF CONTRACT (against Wyoming 
Mineral and its agent Jacobs Engineering). Plaintiff is 
entitled to recover damages from Wyoming Mineral and its 
agent, Jacobs Engineering, caused by Jacobs' failure to 
coordinate and manage the project. 
COUNT VI -- MONEY DUE AND OWING (against Wyoming 
Mineral, Jacobs Engineering and u.s. Construction)· 
- 5 -
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Plaintiff is entitled to recover the reasonable value of 
the services performed and materials it supplied at the 
instance of the defendants on the project. 
In the lower court, defendants did not seriously 
dispute that plaintiff incurred many thousands of dollars 
of excess costs on the project. The dispute is over 
whether plaintiff is barred from recovering his excess 
costs by reason of the doctrine of accord and 
satisfaction, waiver, or by provisions of the 
subcontract. The defendants moved for summary judgment on 
the ground that plaintiff, under one of these theories, 
was barred from recovering its excess costs. (R. 
126-127). Although the Record is silent as to the reason 
the lower court granted the defendants' motion for summary 
judgment, the only issue argued orally at any length was 
that of accord and satisfaction. (R. 215-216). 
Plaintiff formally executed its subcontract with 
u.s. Construction (the general contractor) on April ll, 
1977 (R. 237, ex. D-6), and began work on May 12, 1977. 
(R. 237, ex. D-35). Plaintiff began to incur unforseen 
costs early on, and gave u.s. Construction prompt and 
detailed notice of those costs. On June 29, 1977, 
plaintiff sent u.s. Construction an invoice for excess 
costs incurred from May 19, 1977 to June 24, 1977 and 
provided a detailed breakdown of the reasons for these 
costs and the amount of each. The excess costs to that 
- 6 -
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date were $4,660.00. (R. 237, ex. D-9). At tbe .... 
time, plaintiff submitted an invoice for the first regular 
payment under its subcontract in the amount of ,l,tOO.OO, 
and was paid that amount by a check dated July 13, 1977. 
(R. 237, ex. D-8). 
On July 28, 1977, plaintiff submitted a second 
invoice for excess costs, again itemized in detail. This 
invoice represented excess costs incurred between June 27 
and July 15, 1977 of $6,560.11. (R. 237, ex. D-10). 
Approximately 10 days later, on August 8, 1977, plaintiff 
submitted a third itemized invoice to u.s. Construction 
for excess costs incurred during the balance of July. 
This invoice amounted to $6,632.64. (R. 237, ex. D-11). 
On that same day, plaintiff, obviously realizing 
that excess costs from delay and interference were going 
to continue throughout the project, submitted to U.S. 
Construction a formal "Request for Extra Work 
Authorization and Extension of Time." (R. 237, ex. 
D-12). The request stated that excess costs had been 
incurred through July in the amount of $19,892.75, and 
estimated that an additional $35,173.00 would occur prior 
to completion of the project. 
On August 22, 1977, a meeting was held between 
plaintiff, U.S. Construction, and Jacobs Engineering at 
which plaintiff's excess costs were discussed. In 
- 7 -
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response to that meeting, plaintiff submitted to u.s. 
Construction a formal request that plaintiff be paid the 
contract price for work done under the contract until 
August 12, 1977, that plaintiff be paid an additional 
$35,775.00 to compensate it for excess costs incurred to 
that date, and that plaintiff complete the project on a 
unit-price basis. (R. 237, ex. D-16, D-17, D-18). 
Plaintiff submitted additional invoices to u.s. 
Construction between August 29, 1977 and September 30, 
1977 documenting and requesting additional payment for its 
excess costs during that period. (R. 237, ex. D-21, D-22, 
D-23, D-24, D-29). Ultimately, plaintiff submitted a 
schedule documenting every dollar of its excess costs. 
(R. 237, ex. D-34). 
While u.s. Construction was receiving plaintiff's 
documented invoices for excess costs, u.s. Construction 
made four payments to plaintiff by means of checks 
containing restrictive endorsements, and accompanied three 
of the checks with a separate printed "Waiver of Lien" 
form. (R. 237, ex. D-7, D-8, D-14, D-15, D-30). It is 
these checks and lien waivers that constitute the basis of 
defendants' claim that plaintiff waived its right to 
recover excess costs, or that plaintiff and U.S. 
Construction reached an accord and satisfaction 
discharging them. (The four checks are attached to this 
Brief as an appendix.) 
- 8 -
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Plaintiff received the first sucb cbeck (R. 237, ez. D-8) 
on July 19, 1977 after submitting an invoice for tbe first contract 
payment of $1,400.00 and the first invoice for ezcees costa in tbe 
amount of an additional $4,660.00. (R. 237, ex. D-9). Tbe cbeck 
plaintiff received was in the amount of $1,400.00, the firat pay.ent 
undisputedly due under the subcontract, and included nothing for any 
of the excess costs plaintiff had invoiced. On the face of the 
check, u.s. Construction typed the words, •1st draw on Wyo.ing 
Minerals." On the reverse side of the check appears the 
printed-form restrictive endorsement that provides, in full: 
Endorsement of this check acknowledges 
payment in full for all labor and/or 
materials and/or equipment furnished to date 
by payee and any subcontractors thereof 
toward construction and improvements on the 
property described on the face of this 
instrument and the undersigned hereby waives 
all lien rights in respect to such labor 
and/or materials and/or equipment heretofore 
performed or furnished, and the undersigned 
payee further acknowledges and guarantees 
that this payment is in full satisfaction of 
all labor, laborers and suppliers of labor 
and/or materials of said premises performed 
prior to this date and shall hold the payor 
harmless against any claims for labor or 
materials so furnished. Payee further 
acknowledges and warrants that the labor or 
material for which payment is received 
hereby was actually performed or furnished 
by the person or persons receiving payment 
therefore. 
This instrument may not be negotiated until 
dated and signed by payee(s). 
This check was endorsed by Denise H. Wood, an employee of 
· t d u.s. Construction required her plaintiff, and negot1a e . 
to sign an accompanying "Waiver of Lien" (R. 237, ex. 
D-7), in addition, that provided, in full: 
- 9 -
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I, the undersigned Allen-Howe Specialties 
Corporation in consideration of the sum of 
•1st Draw paid to me, the receipt of which 
is hereby acknowledged, hereby waive and 
release all lien or right of lien now 
existing or that may hereafter arise for 
work or labor performed, or materials 
furnished on or before the 30th day of June, 
1977, for the improvement of the following 
described property situated in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Wyoming Minerals 
9090 Bingham Highway 
Cooperton, Utah 
And I further agree to furnish a good and 
sufficient waiver of lien on said premises 
from every person or persons or corporation 
furnishing labor or materials for said 
premises, who may be acting under any 
contract with me. 
The second check (R. 237, ex. D-14) was dated 
August 9, 1977. It too is accompanied by a Waiver of 
Lien. (R. 237, ex. D-13). W. C. Howe, Jr., the president 
of plaintiff, personally called at U.S. Construction's 
office to pick up the check. Patricia Platts, whom the 
president of u.s. Construction characterized as u.s. 
Construction's secretary-administrator (R. 238 at 28), 
presented Mr. Howe with the check and the printed Waiver 
of Lien. Mr. Howe told Mrs. Platts that he had not been 
paid for very substantial excess costs, and that he would 
not sign a lien waiver purporting to waive his lien rights 
with respect to his excess costs. In the presence and 
full view of Mrs. Platts, Mr. Howe then struck the work 
"all" and interlineated "partial" so that the Waiver of 
- 10 -
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Lien reflected a partial, rather than full, waiver of lien 
for work and materials through July 29, 1977. (R. 236 at 
63-64; R. 238 at 29-30). He then asked Mrs. Platts to 
make a photocopy of the Waiver of Lien, as changed, for 
him. She did so, released the check to him, and he 
departed. (R. 236 at 63-64). 
The check was drawn in the amount of S24,657.40 
which was the contract amount undisputedly due plus a 
small amount for contract extras that u.s. Construction 
admitted it owed. It included nothing for any of 
plaintiff's excess costs that u.s. Construction disputed. 
It contained the same restrictive endorsement as the 
previous check. Mr. Howe took the check to u.s. 
Construction's bank, and asked to speak with a bank 
officer. He showed the check and the lien waiver, as 
changed, to a Mr. Robert Chatfield, who gave him 
permission to change the restrictive endorsement on the 
check by interlineating the work "partial• in place of 
"full" to correspond with the Waiver of Lien. 
Mr. Chatfield then issued Mr. Howe a cashier's check. (R. 
236 at 74). 
u.s. Construction issued its third check to 
plaintiff on September 7, 1977, a month later, in the 
amount of $9,606.96. (R. 237, ex. D-15). This check is 
signed by Patricia L. Platts, the same person who released 
the second check to Mr. Howe after witnessing his 
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8Dd1f1cation of the Waiver of Lien. Mr. Howe followed the 
.... procedure with respect to the third check. That is, 
be picked up the check personally at u.s. Construction's 
office, aade the same change on the lien waiver that 
accoapanied it, took the check to u.s. Construction's bank 
and, with the peraission of a bank officer, 
correspondingly changed the restrictive endorsement on the 
cbeck. (R. 236 at 80). This check contains u.s. 
Construction's typewritten notation on the face: "Payment 
on contract work for steel erection at Wyoming Minerals 
No. 114.• 
Mr. Howe received the fourth and final monthly 
check on October 11, 1977 in the amount of $17,627.64. 
(R. 237, ex. D-30). This time, Mr. Howe picked up the 
check personally from James P. Jensen, the president of 
U.S. Construction. Mr. Jensen did not ask Mr. Howe to 
sign the usual "Waiver of Lien" form: he merely released 
the check. Mr. Howe followed the same procedure of taking 
the check to u.s. COnstruction's bank, and, with the 
permission of an officer, modifying the restrictive 
endorsement. (R. 236 at 92-94). 
After considerable discussion among Jacobs 
Engineering, U.S. Construction and plaintiff regarding the 
delays and ineffeciencies in the project and plaintiff's 
resulting excess costs, u.s. Construction, on November 3, 
1977, tendered to plaintiff a check in the amount of 
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$10,623.25 in full settlement of all of plaintiff's claias 
for excess costs. (R. 237, ex. D-32). Mr. Hove refused 
to accept the check in full settlement of its claia for 
excess costs, and returned it to u.s. Construction with a 
letter so stating. (R. 237, ex. D-33). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY ENTERING A SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS WHEN THE RECORD 
FAILED TO SHOW THAT DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED 
TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND WHERE 
CRUCIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXISTED. 
A. This Court Has Repeatedly Stressed The 
Fundamental Rule That Any Material Issue of 
Fact Is An Absolute Bar To Summary Judgment. 
The district court, in granting defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, ignored the stringent 
standards imposed by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and this Court's interpretation of that rule. 
Rule 56(c) provides in pertinent part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions 
on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there are no genuine issues 
as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. (emphasis supplied) 
This rule, by its literal terms, places on the moving 
party the great burden of demonstrating the absence of any 
material issues of fact. Wright & Miller in their 
treatise neatly summarize the difficulty moving parties 
have in meeting this "burden of demonstrating": 
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It is well-settled that the party moving for 
s~ary judgment has the burden of 
de.onstrating that the Rule S6(c) test - •no 
genuine issue as to any material fact" - is 
satisfied and that he is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. The movant is 
held to a stringent standard. Before 
summary judgment will be granted, it must be 
clear what the truth is and any doubt as to 
the existence of a enuine issue of material 
act w 1 be resolved against the movant. 
The burden is on the movant, the evidence 
presented to the court always is construed 
in favor of the party opposing the motion 
and he is given the benefit of all favorable 
inferences that can be drawn from it. 
Finally, the facts asserted by the party 
opposing the motion, if supported by 
affidavits or other evidentiary material, 
are regarded to be true. (emphasis supplied) 
10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil S 
2727 at 524-30 (1973) and authorities cited therein. This 
Court has repeatededly expressed similar, if not 
identical, sentiments regarding the caution with which the 
district courts should approach the summary judgment 
procedure. 
For example, the cases in this state are legion 
that echo the following statement from Bullock v. Deseret 
Dodge Truck Centers, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P. 2d 559, 561 
( 1960): 
A summary judgment must be supported by 
evidence, admissions and inferences which, 
when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the loser shows that; there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact, and that the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. Such showing must preclude 
all reasonable possibility that the loser 
could, if given a trial, produce evidence 
which would reasonably sustain a judgment in 
his favor. (emphasis supplied) 
- 14 -
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Strand v. Mayne 14 Utah 2d 355, 384 P.2d 396, 397 (1963) 
(summary judgment a •harsh remedy·~ should be granted only 
when viewing evidence in light most favorable to 
non-moving party •it is evident beyond a reasonable 
possibility that if given a trial he could not produce 
evidence to sustain a judgment more favorable to hia.•)r 
Russell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 184, 506 P.2d 
1274 (1973) 1 Christensen v. Financial Service Co., 14 Utah 
2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010 (1963); Frederick May' Co. v. Dunn, 
13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962): Green v. Garn, ll Utah 
2d 375, 359 P. 2d 1050 (1961). 
B. Summary Judgment Is Unjustified on This Record. 
The Record shows that defendants are not entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law, and, in addition, contains 
many material controverted issues of fact. Defendants are 
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the 
accord and satisfaction they assert lacks consideration. 
Even if this lack of consideration were no hurdle, 
defendants would still not be entitled to summary judgment 
because the following controverted material issues of fact 
appear in the Record: (1) Whether the checks tendered by 
U.S. Construction were tendered upon the condition that 
they be received in full satisfaction of plaintiff's claim 
for additional compensation; (2) Whether Patricia L. 
Platts (the employee of u.s. Construction who released two 
checks to plaintiff knowing that plaintiff did not agree 
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to the printed restictive endorsement) had authority to 
80dify tbe condition on which the checks were tendered; 
and (3) Whether plaintiff knew or should have known that 
the check• were tendered by u.s. Construction upon the 
condition that they be received in full satisfaction of 
plaintiff's claim for additional compensation; (4) Whether 
the work plaintiff performed was so different that it 
appeared at the bidding stage that plaintiff is entitled 
to recover in quantum meruit and is therefore not subject 
to defenses based on the contract. 
II. THE ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DEFENDANTS ASSERT 
LACKS CONSIDERATION. 
An accord and satisfaction is, in essence, a 
contract to settle a aispute or discharge a claim 
accompanied by a performance of the contract. Like any 
other contract, an accord must be based upon an offer, 
acceptance of the offer, and must be supported by legal 
consideration. Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 
~· 560 P.2d 1383, 1386 (Utah 1977); Pace v. Pace, 559 
P.2d 964, 967 (Utah 1977); F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. 
Build, Inc., l7 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672-673 (1975). 
See generally 6 Corbin on Contracts Sl279 (1962). 
The accord and satisfaction defendants assert is 
unsupported by any consideration, and therefore is a 
nullity. The invoices plaintiff submitted to u.s. 
Construction during the course of the project fall into 
three categories: (l) claims for progress payments 
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undisputedly due under the subcontract, (2) clai•• for 
additional compensation that u.s. Construction adaitted it 
owed, and (3) claims for additional compensation that u.s. 
Construction disputed. In order to constitute 
consideration for an accord and satisfaction discharging 
plaintiff's disputed claims, u.s. Construction would have 
been required to give plaintiff some payment or other 
consideration over and above what U.S. Construction was 
obligated to pay for the undisputed claims. To this day, 
plaintiff has not received one penny for any of the 
disputed claims. Indeed, U.S. Construction has not even 
paid plaintiff all of what U.S. Construction admits it 
owes. (R. 104-105). 
Under Utah law, it is clear that if a debtor pays 
a creditor no more than the debtor is obligated to pay, an 
accord and satisfaction founded upon the payment will fail 
for want of consideration. As this Court has stated: 
The general rule, and the rule which this 
Court has followed, is that where a claim 
for a definite and undisputed amount which 
is past due, an agreement by the creditor 
... to take a lesser amount, which is 
paid, does not discharge the whole debt. 
This is so because the creditor receives 
only what he is entitled to and there is no 
consideration for the new agreement. 
(emphasis added) 
F.M.A. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 
p. 2d 6 7 0, 6 7 2-6 73 ( 19 6 5) • 
This Court has more recently stated: 
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Ordinarily, the payment of part of a debt 
does not discharge it; and this is true even 
though the paying debtor exacts a promise 
that it will do so. The reason for this is 
tbat in making the part payment, the debtor 
is doing nothing more than he is legally 
obligated to do, and therefore he gives the 
creditor no consideration for the promise 
that the art a ment will be acce ted to 
scharge the entire debt. (emphasis added) 
Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228, 
1229 (Utah 1975). This rule is often summarized by 
stating that part payment of an undisputed and liquidated 
debt furnishes no consideration for an agreement to 
discharge the entire indebtedness. 
A refinement of this rule is applicable to the 
present case. Plaintiff's claim did not consist of one 
undisputed and liquidated sum, but, rather, was one claim 
composed of two parts: a liquidated, undisputed part that 
U.S. Construction admitted it owed, and a disputed part 
that U.S. Construction denied it owed. U.S. Construction 
paid only on the part it admitted it owed; it paid nothing 
at all for the disputed part. 
The courts of a number of other states have 
confronted this problem and held that unless the creditor 
pays something for the disputed part of the claim, there 
can be no accord and satisfaction for the disputed part. 
In Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co. v. Seattle-Tacoma 
Power Co., 63 Wash. 639, 116 P. 289 (1911), a railway 
agreed to purchase electricity at a stated rate from a 
power company, and to pay a minimum of $1,000 per month. 
- 18. -
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A dispute soon arose, with the power company c1aiaing tbat 
it was entitled to something more than $1,000 per .ontb, 
and the railway claiming that only the minimum of ,1,000 
per month was due. The railway began tendering ita 
monthly check for $1,000 on condition that it be accepted 
in full payment for electricity that month. The power 
company endorsed and negotiated the checks. 
The court held that the railway's payment only of 
the undisputed part of the debt was insufficient, aa a 
matter of law, to constitute an accord and satisfaction: 
We cannot conceive, under these facta, how 
the payment of $1,000 each month by the 
railway company and its receipt by the power 
company, under the conditions indicated in 
the payment and receipt, could operate as an 
accord and satisfaction. There was no 
dispute between the parties but that, under 
any construction of the contract, $1,000 was 
due each month. That sum was liquidated 
It was not, therefore, the payment of 
a smaller amount as full payment for a 
larger amount. 
This decision has been repeatedly cited and followed in 
more recent cases. Meyer v. Strom, 37 Wash. 2d 818, 226 
P. 2d 218 (1951); Graham v. New York Life Ins. Co., 182 
Wash. 612, 47 P.2d 1029 (1935); Seattle Investors 
Syndicate v. West Dependable Stores of Wash., 177 Wash. 
125, 30 P.2d 956 (1934); Field Lumber Co. v. Petty, 9 
Wash. App. 378, 512 P.2d 764 (1973). 
In a long line of cases, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court has reached the same result on 
facts very similar to those of the present case. In 
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MacDonald v. Kavanaugh, 259 Mass. 439, 156 N.E. 740 
(1927), a contractor agreed to construct a garage for the 
sua of 110,000. The contractor incurred extra costs as a 
result of changes in the job during construction and made 
a claia for those costs. The building owner responded by 
tendering the unpaid balance of the $10,000 contract price 
on condition that it be received in full satisfaction of 
all of the contractor's claims. 
The court ruled that the payment of the $10,000 
admittedly due furnished no consideration to support an 
accord and satisfaction of the disputed claim for extras. 
Numerous other decisions in Massachusetts, including one 
recent decision, have cited ana applied MacDonald v. 
Kavanaugh. Russell v. Bond & Goodwin, 276 Mass. 458, 177 
N.E. 627 (1931), Shumaker v. Lucerne-In-Maine Commun1ty 
Ass'n, 275 Mass. 201, 175 N.E. 469 (1931); Whittaker Cnain 
Tread Co. v. Standara Auto Supply Co., 216 Mass. 204, 103 
N.E. 695 (1913); Longo Electrical Co., Inc. v. Dumais, l 
Mass. App. 830, 297 N.E.2d 71 (1973). 
The New Mexico Supreme Court has reached the same 
result. In Buel v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 32 N.M. 34, 
250 P. 635 (1926), a double indemnity lite insurance 
policy was in torce. The policy paid $2,000 upon the 
death of the insured by any cause, but pa1d $4,000 if the 
insured died from an accident. A Ols?ute arose between 
the benefic1ary and the company over whether the deatn was 
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accidental. The insurance company tenaered the $2,000 
undisputedly due upon condition that the beneficiary 
acknowledge full satisfaction of his claim. The 
beneficiary acquiesced, and the insurance company clai•ed 
that an accord and satisfaction has been reached. The 
court, however, rejected the claim of accord and 
satisfaction on the ground that the insurance company had 
paid only what it admitted it owed, and gave no 
consideration to support an accord and satisfaction with 
respect to the amount in dispute. The New Mexico Supreme 
Court recently cited Buel approvingly in Clark Leasing 
Corp. v. White Sands Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 
535 P.2d 1077 (1975). Accord, American Life Ins. Co. v. 
Williams, 234 Ala. 469, 175 So. 554, 112 A.L.R. 1215 
(1930). 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also adopted this 
view. In Commercial Union Assur. Co. v. Creek Cotton Oil 
Co., 96 Okla. 189, 221 P. 499 (1923), some cotton was 
destroyed and its owner filed a claim to recover under an 
insurance polcy for the loss. The insurance company 
admitted liability for part of the cotton but denied any 
obligation for the rest. The company then issued a check 
for the cotton undisputedly covered by the policy, but 
tendered it on condition that 1t be received in full 
satisfaction of all claims arising out of the loss. 
The court held that there was no consideration to 
support an accord ana sat1sfaction of the disputed part of 
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tbe claia. Aa a later Oklahoma decision explained, the 
court in co .. ercial Union held that 
where a demand may be separated, a port1on 
liquidated and a portion unliquidated, a 
payment and acceptance and discharge of the 
liquidated amount is not a satisfaction of 
the unliquidated claim, unless it be made on 
some new consideration • • • 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richter, 173 Okla. 489, 49 
P.2d 94, 97 (1935). Accord, Walker v. Ellinghausen, 309 
P.2d lOSS (Okla. 1957). 
The decisions of this Court agree with the 
decisions cited above that an accord and satisfaction 
lacks consideration -- and is a nullity -- when a debtor 
attempts to discharge an entire obligation by paying only 
the amount that he admits he owes. The basic rule, to 
which this Court unquestionably adheres, is that an accord 
and satisfaction requires consideration, and that 
consideration is lacking if the debtor does no more than 
he is obligated to do. Tates, Inc. v. Little America 
Refining Co., S35 P.2d 1228, 1229 (1975) ("in making the 
part payment, the debtor is doing nothing more than he is 
legally obligated to do, and therefore he gives the 
creditor no consideration .... "); F.M.A. Financial 
Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404 P.2d 670, 672-673 
(1965) ("the creditor receives only what he is entitled to 
and there is no consideration for the new agreement"); 
Browning v. Equitable Llfe Assur. Society, 94 Utah 532, 72 
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P.2d 1060, 1068 (1937) (•where the claim is definite and 
no dispute but an admittance of its owing, the agree .. nt 
to take a lesser amount even followed by satisfaction ia 
not good unless attended by some consideration•). 
The refinement of this basic rule -- that the 
payment of only the undisputed part of a claim does not 
discharge the disputed part -- has come before this Court 
twice, and on both occasions this Court has refused to 
find an accord and satisfaction. In Bennett v. Robinson's 
Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966), a 
salesman who had worked on a commission basis terminated 
his employment. Upon his termination, the employer 
presented him with a check tendered on condition that it 
be received in full satisfaction of all outstanding 
commissions. The salesman endorsed and negotiated it. 
The salesman's claim consisted of two parts: 
commissions that were admittedly due, and commissions over 
which there was some dispute. The employer paid him only 
for the undisputed amount of the commissions, and gave him 
nothing as consideration for surrendering his claim to the 
disputed sum. In finding no accord and satisfaction, this 
Court said: 
He was unquestionably entitled to the money 
he did receive; and the dispute was as to 
whether he had more coming. The dispute 
negates any accord; and under the facts 
found by the trial court the [salesman) 
could not equitably be precluded from 
asserting his further claim. 
- 23 -
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1!• at tl7 P.2d 764. Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, 
!!!• cited and approved an earlier decision of this Court, 
Dill!fn v. Maaaey Ferguson, Inc., 13 Utah 2d 142, 369 P.2d 
296 (1962) • 
In Dillaan, the Massey Ferguson Company decided 
to te~inate Dillman's equipment dealership. Dillman 
agreed to a voluntary termination if Massey Ferguson would 
repurchase his parts inventory. Massey Ferguson sent a 
truck to the dealership and picked up all of the parts. 
upon inspecting the parts, however, Massey 
Ferguson decided to reject some and return them to 
Dillman. It then sent Dillman a check for only the value 
of the parts it accepted and tendered the check on 
condition that it be received as "the amount due in full 
to complete recent buy-back on your account." Massey 
Ferguson paid Dillman nothing for the items it disputed. 
This court refused to find an accord and satisfaction: 
There was no dispute as to the amount due 
for those items [that were accepted] and 
therefore it cannot be contended that the 
cashing of the check paying for such items 
constituted and accord and satisfaction of a 
dispute as to whether [Massey Ferguson] 
breached an agreement to buy back other 
items it had rejected .... 
Id. at 369 P.2d 298. 
The case now before this Court is closely 
analagous to these prior Utah decisions, and almost 
precisely on point with the decisions from otner states 
cited above. U.S. Construction paid plaint1ff only part 
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of what it admitted it owed, and gave plaintiff no 
consideration whatever for the compromise of the disputed 
part of plaintiff's claim. u.s. Construction now asserts 
that plaintiff, by receiving the money to which it was 
undisputedly entitled, consented to an accord and 
satisfaction with respect to the disputed items. u.s. 
Construction is attempting to subject plaintiff to what 
Professors White and Summers in their leading hornbook on 
the Uniform Commercial Code have termed •an exquisite fora 
of commercial torture .••• " by tendering what is 
undisputedly due "in full settlement• of all claims. J. 
White and R. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code at 452 
(1972). U.S. Construction's conduct does not represent a 
legitimate attempt to compromise a dispute7 rather it 
seeks to blackmail plaintiff into surrendering his claias 
in order to receive only what is undisputedly due. This 
Court has not condoned such conduct in the past. 
Moreover, Utah's legislative policy, as reflected 
by the enactment of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code, 
rejects a debtor's attempt to inflict this "exquisite form 
of commercial torture." In transactions subject to the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code, a creditor may endorse and 
negotiate a check tendered on condition and defy the 
condition so long as he explicitly reserves his rights. 
Utah Code Ann. §70A-l-207 (1953) provides: 
A party who with explicit reservation of 
rights performs or promises performance or 
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aaaenta to performance in a manner demanded 
or offered by the other party does not 
thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such 
words as •without prejudice,• •under 
protest• or the like are sufficient. 
!bla aectlon is uniformly construed to allow the cashing 
of a check purportedly tendered in full settlement of all 
clal••• and prevent an accord and satisfaction from 
arlalng if the creditor indicates on the instrument that 
be does not so regard it. Clark Leasing Corp. v. White 
Sanda Forest Products, Inc., 87 N.M. 451, 535 P.2d 1077 
(1975): Baillie Lumber Co., Inc. v. Kincaid Carolina 
Corp., 4 N.C. App. 342, 167 S.E.2d 85 (1969). By orally 
protesting, and by striking the word "full" and 
interlineating •partial" on three of the checks, plaintiff 
clearly manifested his unwillingness to agree to an 
accord, and reserved his rights. 
Because plaintiff's subcontract was predominantly 
for services, it is not governed by the Uniform Commercial 
Code. See Bonebrake v. Cox, 499 F.2d 951, 960 (8th Cir. 
1974). The legislative policy the Utah Uniform Commercial 
Code reflects, however, is clearly applicable to the 
present case. The legislative policy is in harmony with 
the judicial decisions cited above -- a debtor may not 
discharge the disputed part of a claim unless he is given 
some consideration beyond what is undisputedly owing. 
There are some decisions in other jurisdictions 
that find consideration for an accord and satisfaction 
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when a debtor pays only the undisputed part of a debt and 
gives nothing for the disputed part. !!! Annot., 112 
A.L.R. 1219, 1225 (1938). The rationale of these 
decisions is apparently that the creditor receives 
consideration by obtaining that to which he is 
undisputedly entitled without having to bring a lawsuit. 
These decisions allow commercial blackmail. The better 
view, as expressed in the cases cited above (including two 
decisions of this Court), requires the debtor to pay 
something above what is undisputedly owing as 
consideration for a legitimate compromise of a disputed 
claim. This Court should adhere to its prior decisions 
and Utah's legislative policy and hold that the accord and 
satisfaction defendants assert is a nullity for want of 
consideration. 
III. PLAINTIFF NEVER ACTUALLY OR CONSTRUCTIVELY 
AGREED TO AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION. 
An accord is a contract and, as such, requires a 
sufficient offer and acceptance to prove a meeting of the 
minds. See Pace v. Pace, 559 P.2d 964, 967 (Utah 1977). 
In cases involving checks with restrictive endorsements, 
the restrictive endorsement usually constitutes the offer 
for an accord, and the cashing of the check with knowledge 
of the condition upon which it is tendered constitutes 
constructive acceptance of the offer. Whether there was 
offer and acceptance 1n the present case is clearly 
- 27 -
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8ubject to disputed aaterial issues of fact that require 
reveraal of the suaaary judgment entered below. 
Defendants contend that four separate checks 
constitute the accord and satisfaction in the present 
caaa. The first one (R. 237, ex. D-8), was received by 
plaintiff on July 19, 1977. The check and the 
acca.panying lien waiver were signed without change by 
Deni•e Wood, an employee of plaintiff. If there had been 
any consideration, plaintiff's receipt of that check would 
probably constitute an accord and satisfaction for claims 
through June 30, 1977, the period for which the check was 
issued. 
No actual or constructive assent to an accord may 
be found in plaintiff's receipt of the other three checks, 
however. Plaintiff received the second check (R. 237, ex. 
D-14) on August 10, 1977. Plaintiff's president, w. c. 
Howe, Jr., called in person at U.S. Construction's office 
to pick it up. He read the all-encompassing lien-waiver 
language and told Patricia Platts, the employee of U.S. 
Construction who gave him the check, that he would not 
sign it. In her presence, he struck the term "full" from 
the lien waiver and inserted the term "partial." He then 
asked Mrs. Platts to make him a copy of the lien waiver as 
modified, which she did. She then took the modified lien 
waiver and released the check to nim. Mr. Howe took the 
check to the bank on which it was drawn, and, with the 
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permission of an officer, changed the restrictive 
endorsement to correspond with the lien waiver by striking 
the word •full• and interlineating •partial.• (R. 236 at 
63-75; R. 238 at 29-31). 
Plaintiff received a third check (R. 237, ex. 
D-15) approximately one month later, on September 7, 
1977. He was presented with an accompanying lien waiver, 
and followed the same procedure of changing the lien 
waiver's restrictive endorsement and leaving the modified 
lien waiver with the u.s. Construction employee who gave 
him the check. Then, as before, he took the check to u.s. 
Construction's bank and, with he permission of an officer, 
modified the check to correspond to the lien waiver. That 
check is signed by Patricia L. Platts, the person who 
released the prior check to Mr. Howe after he had refused 
to agree to a full lien waiver. 
Plaintiff received the fourth check (R. 237, ex. 
D-30) on October 11, 1977. Plaintiff received this check 
directly from James P. Jensen, the president of U.S. 
Construction. The only difference in procedure was that 
Mr. Jensen did not ask Mr. Howe to sign the usual separate 
lien waiver. 
It is undisputed that prior to receiving the 
second, third and fourth checks, Mr. Howe told Patricia 
Platts both verbally and in writing that he would not 
agree to an accord discharging plaintiff's claim for 
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additional coapensation. When a creditor tells his debtor 
that the condition upon which a check is tendered is 
unacceptable, and the debtor nevertheless gives him the 
check, no accord and satisfaction occurs. For example, in 
Moore' McCormack Co., Inc. v. Valley Camp Coal Co., 37 F. 
2d 308 (4th Cir. 1930), a creditor, upon receiving a check 
tendered in full satisfaction of a claim, informed the 
debtor that it was being accepted as part payment only. 
The creditor then told the debtor he should stop payment 
on the check if he insisted that it be received in full 
satisfaction. The debtor did not stop payment on it, and 
the court found no actual or constructive assent to an 
accord and satisfaction. 
Similarly, in Seattle, R. & s. Ry. Co. v. Seattle 
-Tacoma Power Co., 63 Wash. 639, 116 P. 289, 290 (1911), 
a railway company sent a check for $1,000 each month to a 
power company and marked it in full satisfaction of all 
claims. Each month for approximately ten months, the 
power company notified the railway that the check was 
being received as part payment only. In addition to 
holding that the alleged accord and satisfaction lacked 
consideration, the court observed that there could be no 
accord and satisfaction because the railway knew that its 
checks were not being received in full satisfaction. 
In the present case, Patricia Platts knew that 
plaintiff would not accept them in full satisfaction, but 
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issued checks to plaintiff anyway. If Patricia Platta had 
authority to issue u.s. Construction checks to persona wbo 
would not agree to the printed restrictive endoraeaent, 
there can be no accord and satisfaction for want of actual 
or constructive mutual assent. 
The question of Patricia Platts' authority is a 
material controverted issue of fact. On the one hand, Mr. 
Jensen, president of U.S. Construction, testified at his 
depositin that Patricia Platts was merely a secretary 
without authority to modify the conditions upon which a 
U.S. Construction check was tendered. (R. 238 at 42). On 
the other hand, Mr. Jensen characterized Patricia Platts 
as a "secretary-administrator" and admitted that she was 
in charge of collecting lien waivers and had express 
authority to deliver checks upon collection of the lien 
waivers. (R. 238 at 29). Indeed, the record reveals that 
she was authorized to sign the very checks that were being 
conditionally tendered to plaintiff. Her signature 
appears on the check dated September 7, 1977. (R. 237, 
ex. D-15). 
Moreover, Patricia Platts had either implied or 
apparent authority to modify the condition upon which the 
checks were tendered. After having watched Mr. Howe 
modify a lien waiver on August 10, 1977, she not only 
released a check to him on that date, but, a month later, 
released another check to him, with an identical 
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80dification. On October 11, 1977, after another month 
had passed, Mr. Jensen, u.s. Construction's president 
biaself released another check to plaintiff. At no time 
did plaintiff receive any objection to the repeated 
aodifications. u.s. Construction cloaked Patricia Platts 
with express authority to accept lien waivers, release 
checks, and to sign checks. (R. 238 at 29). From 
Mr. &owe's point of view, Patricia Platts certainly had 
either implied or apparent authority to release checks 
upon a modified condition. 
Mr. Jensen's complaint is that his employee, 
Patricia Platts, did not tell him that she had watched Mr. 
Howe modify the conditional language and thereafter 
released two checks to him. (R. 238 at 31). That is not 
plaintiff's fault. The modified lien waivers remained in 
U.S. Construction's office, and Mr. Jensen could have 
reviewed them at any time. Plaintiff relied on the 
authority with which U. S. Construction cloaked Mrs. 
Platts. Defendants will not be heard now to claim that 
she had none. 
At his deposition, Mr. Jensen testified that he 
assumed that U.S. Construction received monthly bank 
statements. (R. 238 at 34). Utah Code Ann. §70A-4-406 
(1953) places a duty on a depositor to examine its bank 
statement within a reasonable time and to discover and 
report unauthorized signature or alterations. More than 
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two months passed between the first modiciation of the 
lien waiver and the issuance of the last check plaintiff 
cashed. If two months or less is a reasonable time within 
which to inspect a bank statement, u.s. Contruction was on 
constructive notice that plaintiff did not agree to the 
printed restrictive endorsement before issuing the last 
check. Hence, another issue of fact appears in the Record. 
Assuming that the accord and satisfaction 
defendants assert did not lack consideration, defendants 
would be entitled to a summary judgment barring 
plaintiff's claims by reason of accord and satisfaction 
only if the record contained undisputed facts establishing 
the following: (1) Patricia Platts had no actual or 
apparent authority on behalf of u.s. Construction to 
modify lien waivers or to release checks in return for 
modified lien waivers; (2) no person at u.s. Construction 
who did have authority should reasonably have noticed the 
modification of the lien waivers prior to issuing the 
third and fourth checks to plaintiff; and (3) that two 
months was not a reasonable time within which U.S. 
Construction should have become aware of the modified 
restrictive endorsement by virtue of its bank statement. 
Because these facts are not established, the 
Record presents a material dispute regarding plaintiff's 
assent to an accord. When the disputed facts are viewed 
in the light most favorable to plaintiff, as they must be 
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on 8 u.aary judg.ent, it is clear that plaintiff did not 
actually or constructively assent to an accord with 
re~ect to plaintiff's claim for additional compensation. 
The au..ary judgment entered below must be reversed so 
that the factual conflict may be resolved. 
IV. THB CHECKS THAT DEFENDANTS ASSERT CONSTITUTE AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION DO NOT CLEARLY STATE 
THE CONDITION UPON WHICH THEY WERE ALLEGEDLY 
TENDERED. 
It is well recognized, both in Utah and 
elsewhere, that in order for a check to constitute an 
accord and satisfaction, it must be unmistakably clear 
that the check is tendered upon the condition that it be 
accepted in full satisfaction of all claims, or not at 
all. Tates, Inc. v. Little America Refining Co., 535 P.2d 
1228, 1230 (1975) ("clearly appear"). As a Texas court 
has stated: 
The minds must meet and where resting in 
implication the facts proved must 
irresistaoly point to such conclusion. 
There must be an unmistakable communication 
to the creditor that the tender of the 
lesser sum is upon the condition that 
acceptance will constitute satisfaction of 
the underlying obligation. Such condition 
must be made plain, definite and certain and 
must be so clear, full and explicit that it 
is not susceptible of any other 
interpretation. 
Pickering v. First Greenville Nat'l hank, 495 S.W.2d 
16, 19 (Tex.Civ.App. 1973). 
This Court has stated on two occasions that 
a check tendered on condition must not only clearly 
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reveal the condition, but must also state that it is 
to be returned and not cashed if the condition is 
unacceptable. In Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 
437 P.2d 202 (1968), this Court refused to find an 
accord and satisfaction when one party cashed a check 
stating, "This is the balance of your account in 
full" because the check did not state that it should 
be returned if the condition were unacceptable; 
(I]t is clear that there was no meeting of 
the minds that the acceptance of the check 
was to be in complete settlement of the 
dispute. The voucher attached to the check 
did not state that the money was to be 
returned if it was not so accepted. 
(emphasis added) 
Id. at 437 P.2d 208. 
This Court has followed the quoted language from 
Hintze v. Seaich in a recent decision. In Cannon v. 
Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1383, 1385 
(1977), an employer sent a terminated salesman a check 
contaiing the following language: 
Endorsement of this check constitutes 
acknowledge of the termination effective 
12-31-73, of my Employment Agreement with 
Stevens-Henager College dated [date], and 
constitutes final and full payment by 
Stevens-Henager College to me in settlement 
of any and all obligations due me from 
Stevens-Henager College. 
This language was found insufficient, as a matter of law, 
to constitute an accord and satisfaction: 
Furthermore, neither by the statement on the 
check nor by other communication did 
defendant express the intention that the 
payment was offered upon the condition it be 
accepted in full satisfaction, or not at all. 
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Id. at 1386. The opinion then quoted the language from 
Hintze v. Seaich requiring the check to state that the 
aoney was to be r.eturned if the condition were 
unacceptable. The checks u.s. Construction submitted to 
plaintiff did not state that they should be returned if 
the restrictive endorsement were unacceptable. 
Moreover, the all-encompassing language of the 
restrictive endorsement on the u.s. Construction checks 
conflicts with language typed on the face of the checks. 
The first check (R. 237, ex. D-8) shows on its face in 
typed language (and typing prevails over printing) that it 
is only intended to pay the first draw on the 
subcontract. The second check (R. 237, ex. D-14) shows 
that it is intended only as a progress payment and as 
payment of certain invoices. The third check (R. 237, ex. 
D-15) is on its face only intended to cover "contract 
work." The fourth check (R. 237, ex. D-30) states it is 
intended to cover all the Wyoming Mineral contract less 
retention. On none of these check is there any suggestion 
that disputed items are being wholly or partially paid. 
At a minimum, a comparison of the front and back of these 
checks give rise to a factual issue -- that is, what was 
the intent of the parties that these checks pay for? The 
language of the checks certainly falls far short of the 
unmistakable, clear and explicit language required before 
a court may find an accord and satisfaction. 
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V. PLAINTIFF HAS NOT WAIVED OR PROMISBD TO ~IVB 
ITS CLAIM FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION 
Defendants argued below that by accepting u.s. 
Construction's checks and signing u.s. Construction's lien 
waivers, plaintiff waived its claim for additioanl 
compensation. A waiver •is the voluntary and intentional 
relinquishment of a known right, claim, or privilege.• 28 
Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver 5154 (1966). •To constitue 
a waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit, or 
advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention 
to relinquish it. It must be distinctly made although it 
may be express or implied." Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90 
Utah 187, 61 P.2d 308, 311-312 (1936). 
The Record shows that plaintiff never 
voluntarily relinquished its claim for additional 
compensation. On the contrary, plaintiff sent U.S. 
Construction numerous invoices for excess costs both 
before and after receiving its checks, and when 
plaintiff's president received the checks, he carefully 
modified the Waiver of Lien froms and restrictive 
endorsements to reflect a lien waiver only for payment 
actually received. In addition, plaintiff rejected two 
offers by u.s. Construction to compromise its claims for 
additional compensation. U.S. Construction first offered 
plaintiff $3,000 in additional compensation, and later 
tendered a check in the amount of $10,623.25 including 
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t4,702.2S for additional compensation. Plaintiff rejected 
both. (R. 238 at 12Si R. 237, ex. D-32, D-33). The 
Record si~ly does not establish a voluntary 
relinquishment of plaintiff's claims. 
This Court has held that a contractor's release 
or waiver of his claims based upon his acceptance of 
conditionally tendered checks stands on the same footing 
as an accord and satisfaction that is, it requires 
autual assent and consideration. Roberts Investment Co. 
v. Gibbons & Reed Concrete Products Co., 22 Utah 2d 105, 
449 P.2d 116 (1969). Defendants are thus precluded from 
asserting that although plaintiff's receipt of u.s. 
Construction's checks does not constitute an accord and 
satisfaction, it may constitute a waiver. Plaintiff 
neither agreed to an accord and satisfaction nor waived 
its claim for additional compensation. 
VI. PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT DOES NOT BAR PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS FOR ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. 
A. The Contract Expressly Recognizes Claims For 
Interference, Delay, Changes and Extras. 
The subcontract between plaintiff and u.s. 
Construction expressly recognizes the right of plaintiff 
to receive additional compensation on account of delay or 
interference: 
Section 6. In the event that the 
Subcontractor's performance of this 
subcontract is delayed or interferred with 
by acts of the Owner, Contractor or other 
subcontractor, he may request an extension 
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of time for the performance of same, as 
hereinafter provided, but shall not be 
entitled to any increase in the subcontract 
price or to damages or additional 
compensation as a consequence of such delay 
except to the extent that Contractor is 
entitled to receive an increase in contract 
price from the Owner. (emphasis supplied) 
(R. 237, ex. D-6). In the district court, defendants 
asserted that this language bars plaintiff's claims, 
insofar as they arise out of delay and interference, and 
urged it as a ground for seeking summary judgment. (R. 
102-104). It does not, however, bar a claim for delay or 
interference. On the contrary, Section 6 expressly 
recognizes that plaintiff may recover on account of delay 
and interference to the same extent that u.s. COnstruction 
is entitled to receive additional compensation from 
Wyoming Mineral. 
The contract between u.s. Construction and 
Wyoming Mineral is incorporated by reference into 
plaintiff's subcontract. (R. 237, ex. D-6, Section 1). 
The u.s. Construction-Wyoming Mineral general contract, in 
General Conditions-A, provides the mechanism by which U.S. 
Construction could receive additional compensation on 
account of interference: 
9. Simultaneous Work by Others. 
(a} ... The Contractor shall make every 
reasonable effort to perform its work 
hereunder in such manner as to enable both 
the work under this contract and such other 
work to be completed without hindrance or 
interference from each other. Any claim of 
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the Contractor arising out of any alleged 
interference due to the conduct of such 
other work shall be made to the Owner in 
writing within five (5) days of the 
occurrence of the alleged interference and 
shall be deemed to have been waived unless 
ao aade. 
(R. 238, ex. D-52). 
u.s. Construction also has a contractual right to 
recover from the owner in the event it incurs additional 
costs as a result of changes or extras. In the event of a 
diapute regarding whether work required to be done is 
extra to the contract, u.s. Construction's contract with 
Wyoming Mineral, in General Conditions-A, provides: 
(c) ••• The Contractor shall, within five 
(5) days after its notice of such direction, 
submit to the Owner a written request for 
the issuance of a written change order. 
Upon receipt by the Owner of any such 
notice, the parties shall endeavor to agree 
as to whether the direction in question 
constitutes an order for a change in the 
work and as to the equitable adjustment, if 
any, to be made. If agreement cannot be 
reached, the Contractor shall promptly 
proceed with the work involved. The cost of 
such work shall then be determined by the 
Owner's Representative on the basis of the 
Contractor's reasonable expenditures and 
savings, including, in the case of an 
increase in the contract sum, a reasonable 
allowance for overhead and profit. 
(emphasis supplied) 
No matter whether the circumstances resulting in 
plaintiff's excess costs are characterized as interference 
and delay, on the one hand, or changes and extras, on the 
other, the contractual provisions prov1de a mechanism by 
which both plaintiff and U.S. Construction may become 
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entitled to additional compensation. Plaintiff inforaea 
u.s. Construction in a timely manner of its excess costs, 
the reason it was incurring excess costs, and deaanded 
additional compensation. Plaintiff sent u.s. Construction 
detailed invoices on June 29, 1977, July 28, 1977, August 
8, 1977, August 29, 1977, August 31, 1977, and Septeaber 
30, 1977. (R. 237, ex. D-9, D-10, 0-11, 0-21, 0-22, D-23, 
D-24, D-27, D-29). Furthermore, u.s. Construction's 
representatives, including a field superintendent, were on 
the job regularly and aware of the situation. (R. 238 at 
20, 86-87). Thus, the contracts in force contemplate 
and clearly do not exclude -- additional compensation to a 
subcontractor, whether for interference, changes or extras. 
B. Whether Plaintiff's Claim Falls Under the 
Contract or Rests in Quantum Meruit Depends 
Upon the Resolution of a Disputed Issue of 
Fact. 
It is not clear from the Record whether 
plaintiff's claims fall within the scope of the contract 
-- and are thus subject to contractual defenses or 
whether they fall outside of the contract and thus outside 
of any contractual defense that defendants may raise. It 
has long been recognized in Utah that when the work a 
contractor actually performs turns out to be substantially 
different than it appeared at the bidding stage, the 
contractor may recover in quantum meruit for his work 
beyond the scope of the contract. Wunderlich Contracting 
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Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 201 (lOth Cir. 1957) 
(applying Utah law)1 Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 F. 457 
(8th Cir. 1900) (applying Utah law). Plaintiff's claim is 
for additional compensation of more than $64,000 on a job 
with a contract price of $53,372. (R. 237, ex. D-6). 
Plaintiff's claim raises a factual question whether the 
work performed, because of delay, interference and u.s. 
Construction's mistakes, was so substantially different 
than contemplated at the bidding stage that pla1ntiff is 
entitled to recover in quantum meruit rather than under 
the contract. If so, defendant's contractual defenses are 
inapplicable. Hence, the contractual provisions afford no 
basis at all for sustaining the summary judgment entered 
below. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment entered below dismissing all 
of plaintiff's claims for additional compensation on the 
uranium extraction facility project was manifestly 
improper. Insofar as the district court ruled that 
plaintiff's claims are barred by an accord and 
satisfaction it not only erred on the law -- because the 
accord and satisfaction defendants assert lacks 
consideration -- out overlooked the numerous material 
issues of fact regard1ng the cond1tion, 1f any, upon which 
checks were tendered to plaintiff, whether plaintiff 
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actually or constructively assented to the condition, and 
whether the condition, if any, was modified. 
Insofar as the district court ruled that 
plaintiff's claims are barred by contractual defenses it 
erred on the law -- because the contract expressly 
recognizes a subcontractor's claims for additional 
compensation -- and overlooked the material issue of fact 
of whether the work plaintiff did was so different from 
that contemplated that plaintiff is entitled to recover in 
guantum meruit instead of under the contract. On this 
Record, depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to have ita 
evidence on these questions heard by a trier of fact would 
be a great injustice. This action must be remanded to the 
district court for trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
0~~~ 
Peter w. B!lli~ 
Warren Patten 
Charles B. Casper 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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WAIVER OF LIEN 
iTO .. ~: ... ~: ... ~~~~~~~-~!.~~~.! ... ~-~-~:L.~.! ... ~?.!-:~-~--~~~--~~~-~.1 ... ~.~-~ La'lte City, Utah 84116 
I, the undersigned ..... M ~ !m:: JJ~.fi! ... l;;P.e.c.h.lti u .. C9rp9.ra..t.ion ................................................ ., 
in consideration of the sum of $.~~ •. 657. .. ~0 ..... paid rome, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledpd. 
hereby waive and re\fl"ase ~I lien or right of lien now existing or that may hereafter arise fex work ex labor 
I ..Jf.l. 1-v. •1::4 . 
performed, or Materials "i~nished on or before th~ ... 7.9.t.'h .... day of ........... J.\1.1-Y ...................... , 19.7.7... .. 
lor the improvement of the following described property siruated in ................. Salt .. Lake. .......... Counl)', 
Srare of ........ JJ.t~ ............................... , to-wit: 
············-~·0·~-~.S. .. ~-~~~~~!i .. ~~:r:P.~!~~-~-C?~ .................................................................................. . 
. .............. ~_0_9_~---~·i·~-~~.B:~ .. H.~~~~~Y. .................................................................................................. . 
.................... .COpper-ton, ... Ut.ah ........................................................................................................... .. 
And I further agree to furnish a good and sufficient waiver ol lien on said premises from every person ex 
persons or. corporation furnishing labor or_ materials ~r said premises, who may _be acting under any 
'-~~-~~-~2~~l:;:>t.· ...... 19.7.7... . ....... q .. ~~~~ .. -.. jt~y:fl~:-::~t~---~1-~-.f:.. ...................... .. 
I hereby certify that the labor or material, or l;>oth, receipted for above was acrually performed, ex 
used, at the above described property. /lj./· . _ jrl ll . 51.·~., ;i; r {.· ./. 
(.{ A./l ' ·...L.-(.1 ., ,, ... "'·4£ L; 4 •' .. y-~ 
................................ ·;.1/.:':-f[-·J..r.l.•·······~······--···········--------------
llANI' NC 115- ()Go I.~ PTG CO - 321: SO 2600 £,t..ST- SAL.T LA"I. CITY 
.; 
• I 
I 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT 
~
"'l:J-13 
.!2 . .:>~. 'e 
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